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CRIMINAL LAW-ENTRAPMENT-AN END?
State v. Rowan, 32 Ohio App.2d 142, 288 N.E.2d 289 (1972)
N State v. Rowan,' James W. Rowan was indicted, tried by a
jury, and found guilty of the sale of marijuana and the delivery
of a dangerous drug (methedrine) in violation of the Ohio Revised
Code.2 The sales and deliveries which resulted in the conviction of
the Defendant were made to one Gene Chicoine, an informant working
for the offices of the Prosecutor of Summit County, Ohio. At the
time of trial, Mr. Chicoine was the subject of a Grand Jury investigation
as to his activities in the traffic of narcotics.
The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of Mr. Chicoine and
on one other informant to convict the Defendant. Furthermore, the trial
court charged the jury as to Ohio Revised Code Section 3719.14 that
this section could be construed as to allow law enforcement officers to
sell and deliver (emphasis added) drugs as well as possess them.3
1 State v. Rowan, 32 Ohio App.2d 142, 288 N.E.2d (1972) states with reference to
the narcotics conviction:
[T] his court held in State v. Graham, case No. 6755, Summit County [unre-
ported], that an undercover agent engaged in the business of trying to stamp
out the illicit drug traffic may smoke marijuana in order to give the appearance
of validity to his conduct. We extend this reasoning to conduct involving the
delivery and sale of drugs to others, when the purpose of such conduct is to
ferret out the illegal drug trade, and bring to justice those engaged in it....
Id. at 143-144, 288 N.E.2d at 831.
2 Omo REv. CODE § 3917.14 (Page 1953) provides that:
Sections 3719.01 to 3719.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code in so far as they
restrict the possession and control of narcotic drugs do not apply to ...(B) Public officers or their employees in the performance of their official duties
requiring possession or control of narcotic drugs;(C) Temporary incidental possession, or by persons whose possession is for the
purpose of aiding public officers in performing their official duties....
3 Brief for Appellant at 3, State v. Rowan, 32 Ohio App.2d 142, 288 N.E.2d 829(1972) reads in part:
[Niow, I give you these instructions because of evidence that there was some
possession by a public officer of certain drugs. Also, with reference to ampheta-
mines and barbituates, there is a provision that nothing in this section shall be
construed to interfere with or make illegal the purchase, collection or possession
of any drug or drugs by any law enforcement official when these are to
purchase, or collect or possess such a drug or drugs in the performance with his
official duties as a law enforcement officer....
[2551
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One of the grounds for Defendant's appeal 4 was that Section 3719.14
of the Ohio Revised Code does not allow police officers or their agents to
sell and deliver drugs. The Court of Appeals, however, regarded this
contention as without merit and held that the reasoning which allows an
undercover narcotics agent to smoke marijuana in order to give the
appearance of validity to his conduct, may be extended to conduct
involving the delivery and sale of drugs to others, when the purpose of
such conduct is to "ferret out the illegal drug trade and to bring to justice
those engaged in it." 5 This court thus gives anyone acting under the
authority of a law enforcement agency the right to engage in unlimited
conduct in order to make arrests for narcotics violations.
The defense of entrapment in narcotics cases has taken on a new
importance since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Sherman v. United States, wherein Mr. Justice Brennan established a
two-part test, whereby police conduct would be scrutinized so as to
reveal any activity which falls below standards "for the proper use
of governmental power" and secondly, whether the intention to commit
the crime originated with the defendant or was the product of "creative
activity" of law enforcement officials. 6
With narcotics violation arrests seemingly increasing, courts are
more often confronted with the issue of entrapment. The Sherman
court further refined the issue as involving the unlimited power of
law enforcement officials stating:
[W]hen the criminal design originates with the officials of the
government and they implant in the mind of the innocent person
the disposition to commit the alleged offense. . . stealth and strategy
become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession
and the unlawful search .... 7
Much of the Sherman decision was based on the opinion of Chief
4 There were three grounds for appeal from the trial court which were: (1) That the
trial court erred when it refused to grant a continuance in order to allow the deposi-
tions of the state's primary witnesses to be transcribed and afford defendant-appellant
an opportunity to adequately prepare a cross-examination for those witnesses,(2) That the trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance of the commencement
of the trial in order to ascertain the outcome of a pending grand jury investigation
directed against the state's principal witness, Gene Chicoine, and (3) That the court
erred in refusing to charge the jury that Section 3917.14 of the Ohio Revised Codedoes not allow police officers or their agents to sell and deliver marijuana or other
narcotic drugs. State v. Rowan, 32 Ohio App.2d 142, 143, 288 N.E.2d 829, 830 (1972).
5 State v. Rowan, 32 Ohio App.2d 142, 144, 288 N.E.2d 828, 831 (1972).
6 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
7 Id. at 372.
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Justice Hughes in Sorrells v. United States8 which held that entrapment is:
"mhe conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and his
procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpertrated
it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer....
Through the years, courts across the country have adhered to the
principles set forth in Sherman and Sorrells, with minor variations. 10 The
Ohio position on entrapment is best expressed in State v. Forte, where
the defendant was convicted of blackmail. The court here set forth a
two-part test for entrapment requiring that the entrapper instigate the
offense and then that he incite the accused to commit the offense
for the purpose of prosecution." From the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Rowan, the construction given to Section 3719.14 of the
Ohio Revised Code comports well with the test given in Forte. It is
quite conceivable that the defense of entrapment would succeed against
any violation of Section 3719.14 as interpreted by Rowan.
Ohio is not the only state which faces the problem of vague narcotics
statutes.' 2 Many states fail to define what constitutes unlawful possession
8 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Here, a federal liquor law violation
was in issue. The Court urged that the federal statute (NATIONAL PROHBMITION ACT 27
U.S.C.A., Repealed 1933) be construed liberally and not in such a manner so as to
avoid "absurd consequences."
91d. at 454.
10 Brooke v. U.S. 385 F.2d 279 (U.S. App., D.C. 1967); U.S. v. Barrios, 457 F.2d
680 (9th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Brewbaker, 454 F.2d 1360 (Ind. C.A. 1972); U.S. v.
Catazaro, 407 F.2d 998 (N.J. C.A. 1969); U.S. v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir.
1972); U.S. v. Silver, 457 F.2d 1217 (3rd Cir. 1972); McKay v. State, 489 P.2d 145
(Alaska 1971); State v. Chudy, 108 Ariz. 23, 492 P.2d 402 (1972); People v.
Uhlemann, 105 Cal. Reptr. 21, 503 P.2d 277 (1972); People v. Hankin . ..... Colo.
App ........ 498 P.2d 1116 (1972); State v. Fine, 159 Conn. 296, 268 A.2d 649 (1970);
Brosi v. State, 263, So.2d 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Spencer v. State, 263
So.2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Hill v. State, 225 Ga. 117, 166 S.E.2d 338
(1969); People v. Caziaux, 119 IMl. App.2d 11, 254 N.E.2d 797 (1969); State v.
Wheat, 205 Kan. 439, 469 P.2d 338 (1970); State v. Allen, 292 A.2d 167 (Maine
1972); Rettman v. State, 15 Md. App. 666, 292 A.2d 107 (1972); Commonwealth
v. Miller- ...... Mass. Rpts ........ 282 N.E.2d 394 (1972); People v. Sinclair, 30 Mich.
App. 473, 186 N.W.2d 767 (1971); State v. Bradshaw, 12 N.C. App. 510, 183 S.E.2d
787 (1971); State v. Forte, 29 Ohio App.2d 24, 277 N.E.2d 559 (1971); Bradley
v. State, 485 P.2d 767 (Okla. Crim. 1971); Vera v. State, 473 S.W.2d 22 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971); State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P.2d 1265 (1972); Ritter
v. Commissioner, 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970); State v. Waggoner, 80 Wash.
2d 7, 490 P.2d 1308 (1971).
11 State v. Forte, 29 Ohio App.2d 24, 26, 277 N.E.2d 559, 561 (1971). The defense of
entrapment failed in this case because, in the words of the court: "[Ilt is beyond
doubt that the scheme originated with him [the defendant] and his cohort and the
police were but observers when the criminal act was committed .... "
12 Some statutes similar to § 3719.14 of the OHIO REv. CODE are: ALAS. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.10.110 (1962); ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1012 (1956); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit.
16, H3 4706(d) (Cum. Supp., 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 398 § 398.13 (1960);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2366 (1954); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 54-131
(Supp., 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch.- 94 § 187B (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 113.3 (1965).
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and control of drugs by law enforcement officers. This contention is
apparent from the fact that these states leave narcotic arrests vulnerable
to the entrapment defense when the statutes typically read:
The provisions ... restricting the possessing and having control of
narcotic drugs shall not apply to... public officers or their employees
in the performance of their official duties requiring possession or
control of narcotic drugs; or to temporary incidental possession
by employees or agents of persons lawfully entitled to possession, or
by persons whose possession is for the purpose of aiding public
officers in performance of their official duties.'5
It is precisely this type of language that the court in Rowan attempts to
interpret, so to construe the meaning of the words "possession and
control"'14 to read sell and deliver (emphasis added).
Numerous jurisdictions15 have been unwilling to grant law enforce-
ment officers and undercover agents the authority to sell and deliver
drugs.16 The reasoning appears to be that such conduct would inevitably
create traps for the unwary innocent. In addition, some courts have
fallen back on the creative activity test as stated in Sherman v. United
States. A Federal District Court in United States v. Silver, cited
Sherman17 when it applied the creative activity test to a situation
involving a purchase of marijuana by narcotics agents.
The Rowan court has given the narcotics agent a free hand to
ferret out alleged narcotic violators. Undoubtedly, the Rowan decision
will expose hundreds of innocent people to the realism of jails in the
State of Ohio. The Rowan decision clearly creates a situation whereby
anyone on the street may be approached by an agent in order to
obtain a narcotics conviction.
Courts have attempted to define what manner of activity is necessary
to constitute entrapment. Such definitions have embraced terminology
which can easily be applied to the facts in Rowan. Conduct which
amounts to mere persuasion of the average person has been deemed to be
13 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1012 (1956).
14 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3719.14 (Page 1953).
15 See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 263 So.2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). (For further
authority, see the cases cited in n. 10 infra.).
16 Id. at 283. The court implied that there are definite limits within which a narcotics
agent may act, when it said: "[Out of regard for its own dignity, this court can not
allow agents of the state to engage in illegal acts and schemes designed to encourage
rather than detect crime...."
17 United States v. Silver, 457 F.2d 1217, 1219 (3rd Cir. 1972), accord, People v.
Hankin, ..... Colo ........ 498 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1972).
[Vol. 6:2
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 6 [1973], Iss. 2, Art. 14
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol6/iss2/14
sufficient to constitute entrapment.'8 This, however, is a very liberal
interpretation of the term and courts have not generally acquiesced to such
standards. 19 For the most part, courts determine whether there has been
entrapment on the basis of "inducement," "encouragement" and "luring."
20
In State v. Cowan,21 the defendant was convicted of selling about
$500.00 worth of marijuana to a narcotics agent. Although the conviction
was sustained based on the sale issue, the court failed to recognize that
purchase by the agent of an amount worth $500.00 would necessarily
create an inference that the agent was planning to sell the drug at a later
date. The court does not comment upon the impropriety of such conduct,
but the Rowan decision makes such conduct entirely within the limits
of "official duties."
Whether or not the sale and delivery of drugs by a narcotics agent
constitutes a proper use of governmental power as determined in
Sherman, has not yet been decided. It is not unreasonable to construe
delivery of drugs by a narcotics agent to a possible narcotics violator as
that degree of intolerable participation by governmental authorities so
as to color the entire arrest with the stain of trickery. This proposition
was advanced in United States v. Russell where a narcotics agent was
involved in the manufacture of methaphetamine. It was shown in the case
that had it not been for the agent's delivering one of the essential
ingredients of the drug to the defendant, there could have been no
manufacture, delivery, or sale of the end product.22 The construction
given Section 3719.14 of the Ohio Revised Code in the Rowan case would
undoubtedly present a similar issue. Under the Rowan ruling, it is possible
to make narcotics arrests based on the possession of drugs by the
defendant, the essential element, which would be lacking were it not for
the conduct of the narcotics agent by his delivery of the drug.
18 Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969), cited in McKay v. State, 489
P.2d 145, 149 (Alaska 1971) in which the court said:
[U]nlawful entrapment occurs when a public law enforcement official, or a
person working in cooperation with him, in order to obtain evidence of the
commission of an offense, induces another person to commit such an offense by
persuasion or an inducement which would be effective to persuade the average
person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit such an offense....
19 See, e.g., State v. Chudy, 108 Ariz. 23, 492 P.2d 402 (1972). (For further
authority, see cases cited in n. 10 infra.).
20 Id.
21 State v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d 410 ........ 490 P.2d 890, 892 (1971).
2 United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972) in which the court
stated:
[We need not resolve the precise issues apparently presented by the parties.
For regardless of the significance of "predisposition" as an element in
"entrapment," we conclude that a defense to a criminal charge may be founded
upon an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal
enterprise ...
REcENT CASESSpring, 1973]
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Good faith has been considered an important element in order to
sustain a conviction produced through the efforts of an undercover
narcotics agent. It is essential that the agent or officer act in good faith for
the purposes of "discovering or detecting a crime."23 The same contention
was set forth in Rettman v. State, where one of the defendants contacted a
police officer for the purchase of hashish in retain for cocaine and cash.24
The Rowan case not only unreasonably extends the limits within
which police officers or narcotics agents may act in an attempt to ferret
out the illegal drug traffic, but it also does not require that the officials
act in good faith. In short, there is nothing in Rowan which, in allowing
police officers or agents to sell and deliver drugs, insures that such persons
will act for motives based entirely on legal concepts. It is of common
knowledge that many of the agents used by the police department for
the purpose of arresting narcotics violators, have police records of
their own. Rowan was based on information received from an informer
working as an agent who, at the time of trial, was under investigation
by the Grand Jury for his own alleged narcotics violations. There is
nothing in Rowan which would prevent such a person from giving
information and acting based on personal feelings. At this point, the
utility of the Rowan decision begins to dwindle.
Rowan creates a trap for the individual who is confronted by the
undercover narcotics agent and who had no intention of committing
the crime. That the crime is more likely to occur under Rowan cannot
be doubted. It is of utmost significance that the narcotics agent may
sell and deliver drugs. Courts cannot ignore a change of social mores
which have occurred. 25 More and more people are willing to accept the
existence of conduct which was previously branded as criminal behavior.
It is precisely these people that the Rowan decision sets out to trap. This
entire dilemma is illustrated by State v. Karathanos when the court stated:
"inhere is a controlling distinction between inducing a person to do an
unlawful act and setting a trap to catch him in the execution of a
criminal design of his own conception. ' ' 26
23 Brosi v. State, 263 So.2d 849, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) where the court said
in affirming the conviction of the defendant for the sale of marijuana: "[Tlhe
officers acted in good faith for the purpose of discovering or detecting a crime and
merely furnished the opportunity for the commission thereof by defendant who had
the requisite criminal intent...."
24 Rettman v. State, 15 Md. App. 666, 292 A.2d 107 (1972).
25See generally, MARIJUANA: A SIGNAL OF MIsuNDERST. ,wn'o. Tan TEccA.
PAPERS OF THE FIRST REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND
DRUG AnUSE, U.S. Gov't Printing Office: 1972.0-457-006 (Vol. 1).
26 State v. Karathanos, 493 P.2d 326, 331 (Mont. 1972) where the court also provided
a definition of entrapment by setting forth: "[Only when the criminal design
originates, not within the accused, but in the minds of government officers and the
accused is, by persuasion, deceitful representations, or inducement, lured into
the commission of a criminal act, can a case of entrapment be made out,..."
[VoL 6:2
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Had Ohio a statute explaining the conduct of an undercover narcotics
agent with regard to entrapment, possibly, the Rowan decision might be
seen in a less glaring stance. The State of Illinois has a statute which
defines entrapment in terms of both law enforcement officers and agents.
27
Such a statute serves two purposes: First, it provides a basic and rather
reasonable definition of entrapment. Second, it establishes a qualification
to the rule and puts one on notice of the requisite elements of entrapment.
Rowan clearly has taken a giant step beyond all rational and logical
attempts to create an environment in which the unwary and the innocent
are not caught in the same net as the average criminal. Criminal intent in
the mind of the accused is still a prerequisite in order to obtain a
conviction. It is not difficult to imagine that an undercover narcotics agent
who offers to sell a small quantity of drugs, and succeeds in doing so, has
planted the seed of criminal intent in the mind of the accused. The
North Carolina rule with respect to intent was stated in State v. Bradshaw
when the court said:
The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that mere initiation,
instigation, invitation, or temptation by enforcement officers is not
sufficient to establish the defense of entrapment. It is also necessary
to show that the Defendant would not have committed the offense
except for the persuasion, encouragement, inducement, and impor-
tunity of the officer or agent.
2 8
Rowan's vague and general language of sell and deliver (emphasis
added) can be easily thought to consist of some elements of inducement
and encouragement. Rowan prescribes no standards as to how such a
sale and delivery are to take place. In the absence of such standards, it
can be assumed that the accused was entrapped by the conduct of the
narcotics agent. There are many methods of sale and delivery of drugs
by a narcotics agent who is uncontrolled in his conduct. If the agent is
given a free -hand in his method of operation, it is only natural that
he should use his own ingenuity to carry out his instructions. Given
the agent's authority to act as determined in Rowan, a court would have
to presume that each defendant brought before it was the subject of
some kind of inducement or persuasion. Massachusetts has recognized
the problem in Commonwealth v. Miller:
2 7 ILL. STAT. ANN. Ch. 38 § 7-12 (Smith Hurd 1962) which reads:
[A] person is not guilty of an offense if his conduct is incited or induced by a
public officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining
evidence for the prosecution of such person. However, this section is
inapplicable if a public officer or employee, or agent of either, merely affords
to such person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense in
furtherance of a criminal purpose which such person has originated ......
28 State v. Bradshaw, 12 N.C. App. 510, 513, 188 S.E.2d 787, 790 (1971).
Spring, 1973] RECENT CASES
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The rule is that once government inducement has been shown there
are two issues. The government should establish that it was engaged
in no conduct that was shocking or offensive per se, and that the
defendant was not in fact, corrupted by the inducement. 29
There are dire implications created by Rowan. By taking a position
that is totally inconsistent with the current trend of decisions, 0 Rowan
is attempting to put the narcotics violator in jail, at the expense of the
unwary innocent victim who has been lured, encouraged, and induced
into a minor narcotics violation. Rowan rationalizes its sweeping effect
by explaining that its decision is aimed at conduct "to ferret out the illegal
drug trade, and to bring to justice those engaged in it.'"31 It connotes
a valid meaning but it is unable to define its objectives.
The Rowan decision can only be viewed as an attempt to eliminate
the defense of entrapment. Rowan has ignored important elements of the
commission of a crime such as intent and willfulness. Rowan refuses to
recognize that its quest for law and order is totalitarian in effect. Law
enforcement officers and undercover narcotics agents may possess, sell
and deliver drugs. They may do so in any way they deem best, so long
as the ultimate objective is to suppress the illegal drug trade.
This nation has never been receptive to the idea of secret police.
Rowan in effect, creates such a body whose one and only purpose is to
bring to justice alleged narcotics violators through discriminatory
enforcement. This situation is clearly set forth by the following:
It is axiomatic, of course, that our constitutional guarantees of due
process and equal protection forbid legislative enactment of criminal
laws that invidiously apply to one class of persons. It is abundantly
clear, however, that there are many situations in which the legislature
gives the policeman the latitude to do precisely what the legislature is
forbidden to do itself. This latitude is not based on an express
statutory grant; on the contrary, statutes frequently purport to
mandate full enforcement of all criminal laws. Nevertheless, existing
side-by-side with these statutory mandates are other statutes which
clearly do not contemplate full enforcement, statutes prescribing
conduct which the legislature did not intend to be the subject of
enforcement efforts. Such statutes permit police to define the actual
limits of criminal conduct.3 2
29 Commonwealth v. Miller ....... Mass. Rpts ........ 282 N.E.2d 394, 400 (1972).3oSee, e.g., U.S. v. Haley, 452 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1972). (For further authority, see
the cases cited at n. 10 infra.).
31 State v. Rowan, 32 Ohio App.2d 142, 144, 288 N.E.2d 829, 831 (1972).
32 Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1931 DuxE L.J. 717,
720 (1971).
[Vol. :2
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Rowan creates precisely this situation. The Court is attempting to do
that which the legislature cannot do. Rowan is giving life to the
proposition of selective enforcement.
Rowan has further exceeded its authority by rendering an interpreta-
tion of a statute which should be best left to the legislators. At a time
when many state legislatures are revising their criminal codes, it is not
inconceivable that some of their efforts be pointed toward the updating
and clarification of their now-antiquated drug laws. Rowan has failed to
see the necessity of a legislative determination for the problem with which
it dispenses in a few short pages, supported by a single unreported case.
33
The authorization of the conduct of "sale and delivery" which
Rowan prescribes, is one which cannot be given lightly. Rowan creates
a rule which is totally inconsistent with the prevailing law on the
defense of entrapment in narcotic cases. 34 It is a decision by one man
which should have been made, if at all, by hundreds sitting in the
state legislature. Rowan serves only to create a class of criminals who
have committed no crime.
KENNETH D. MORSE
33 State v. Graham, No. 6755, Summit Cty. App. Ct. (Ohio, Jan. 19, 1972) which
concerned the reliability of Gene Chicoine, the state's principal witness in State
v. Rowan.
34 See, e.g., People v. Uhlemann, 105 Cal. Reptr. 21, 503 P.2d 277 (1972). (For
further authority, see the cases cited in n. 10 injra.).
Editor's Note: On March 15, 1973, the Supreme Court of Ohio, Case No. 73-52
denied certiorari on the appeal.
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